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Abstract
Pro forma EPS reporting is a fairly new accounting disclosure; it has since been
modified in 2003 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to include additional
disclosure and filing requirements. This “Regulation G” has been around for nearly a
decade and since that time a major financial crises in the United States has occurred.
This study attempts to analyze trends in pro forma EPS reporting within the S & P 500
constituents during the Great Recession, and speculate as to whether earnings
management was apparent. This study provides evidence that there was a significant
increase in the proportion of pro forma disclosers and magnitudes of those disclosers.
Results also indicate that the presence of negative earnings and intangibles have a
significant effect on the magnitude of these differences and that there appears to be a
level of consistency in pro forma reporting among firms. Results allude to the possibility
of short term and long term earnings management strategies during the Great recession
among S & P 500 constituents.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to add to the existing literature by looking at the
effects the Great Recession had on pro-forma numbers and to speculate what may explain
the trends seen in the results. For over two decades, an ongoing debate between two
different profitability reporting measures, GAAP and “pro-forma”, has raged on. Pro
forma earnings became a platform for companies to recast earnings to portray to investors
a reported measure that more closely identified “core” earnings that they expected to
carry on through the future.1 Over time, security analysts, investors, in addition to the
press have increasingly been relying on these pro forma earnings to base decisions.
However, the increasing gap between GAAP EPS and pro forma EPS has become a
subtle form of earnings management2.
When the dot-com bubble burst, companies such as Enron were prime examples
of the risks investors faced in observing pro forma earnings. Enron showed a much
healthier financial picture via deceitful reconciliation of pro forma figures. Enron was the
catalyst that forced the SEC to step in and implement regulations to protect investors
from companies wrongly increasing earnings via pro-forma announcements. In 2002, in
conjunction with Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation G was passed that forced companies to
clearly show how they got to their pro-forma number. Research that was conducted postregulation show a decrease in shady pro-forma announcements; however, it is clear that
companies are continuing to find ways around regulations to mislead investors. It has

1

Phillips, T., M. Luehlfing, and C. Vallario. 2002. Hazy reporting. Journal of Accountancy (August):
47.50
2
Bradshaw, M., Sloan, R., 2002. GAAP versus the Street: An empirical assessment of two
alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 41–66
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been over a decade since regulation G was put in place. To the best of my knowledge,
previous studies have not looked at trends in pro forma figures during tough economic
times.
This study provides evidence that there was a significant increase in the
proportion of pro forma disclosers and the magnitudes of those disclosers, as well as,
results indicating that the presence of negative earnings and intangibles have a significant
effect on the magnitude of these differences seen between pro forma and GAAP.
This study contributes to the current literature in several ways. In particular, since
the proliferation of pro forma earnings, three US economic recessions have occurred, and
no study has specifically looked at pro forma trends during these times. Pro forma
earnings were rare and fairly new during the early 1990s economic downturn, and the
regulations put in place during the economic recession of the early 2000s may have
curbed any trends that existed. The recent Great Recession provides a setting far enough
removed from Regulation G to observe possible earnings manipulation via pro forma
announcements. This study also contributes to literature related to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and the lasting effects of Regulation G.
My results point to the importance of reminding financial statement users of the
tricky details that lie within footnotes, which can be so easily overlooked. My results
suggest that the pressures of economic decline may be a catalyst to bring managers back
to their bad habits of opportunistic behavior, and my study opens up more room for future
research to dive deeper.
The remainder of the study is as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present a brief
background to the pro forma debate and prior literature on the topic, respectively. Section
7

4 describes the data. The methodology and results are presented in Section 5. The final
section concludes.

2. Background
Pro-forma, or “street earnings”, became relevant in the early 1990s as many dotcom companies began to adjust their audited GAAP earnings for items they deemed to be
“unusual” or “non-recurring” and irrelevant to their “core” earnings. In many cases
“street” earnings do illustrate a clearer picture of the actual earnings potential of a
company. Companies must adhere to GAAP which enforces much stricter rules when
reporting earnings. The idea behind pro forma is to allow companies to exclude some
non-cash or one-time cash expenses such as depreciation, goodwill, amortization,
restructuring, merger costs, stock based employee pay, and other transitory items that
would help investors see the true operating potential.
However, over time, understanding what went on to arrive at pro forma earnings
became hazier. SEC chairman Harvey Pitt was often outspoken about the pro forma
practice, complaining that there is no comparability, therefore no investor, especially an
ordinary investor can read these in a way that is useful.3 Leading up to the dot-com
bubble burst in the early 2000s, research was beginning to indicate that managers were
using pro forma earnings opportunistically. In 1992, within the S&P 500, only 31
companies reported any pro forma earnings that differed from GAAP; by 1999 more than

3

Levinsohn, A. 2002. Popularity of pro forma earnings prompts reform. Strategic Finance 83: 63.65.
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half had played the pro forma game.4 The difference between GAAP and pro forma hit an
all-time high during 2001.
The early 2000s marked a slowdown in the US economy. The unregulated pro
forma practice allowed companies to try and avoid reporting bad earnings. In the two
weeks ending September 7, 2001, the Nasdaq lost 12 percent and this collapse was
blamed, in part, on the inflated valuation based on accounting smoke and mirrors.5
Despite the critics and the lack of comparability, pro forma was here to stay. As Liesman
and Weil reported, “pro forma is the profitability figure most widely watched by Wall
Street analysts and many investors; when a company announces earnings that meet or
beat ‘the street’ it tends to be a significant factor in moving the stock price.”6 It was
becoming clear that regulation was needed.
In response to the exploitation of non-GAAP reporting, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 401
(b); commonly referred to as Regulation G. This new rule, which went into effect in
March 2003, required that: (1) a pro forma report cannot omit any information that would
make the report in any way misleading to investors, and (2) a pro forma announcement
must provide a complete reconciliation between the pro forma figure and the GAAP
number7. Research conducted in the immediate years following Regulation G indicate
that the legislation succeeded, by producing modest declines in frequency as well as

4

Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley &
Sons, 2003. Print.
5

Dreman, D. 2001. Fantasy earnings. Forbes (October 1).
Liesman, S., and J. Weil. 2001. Different views of .special items lead to various figures for S&P 500
profit.Wall Street Journal (August 24).
7
Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean,
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003).
6
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magnitudes of pro forma reporting.8 On the other hand, to some, the SEC intervention
may have caused an unforeseen cost; managers, afraid of scrutiny, are less transparent in
terms of informing investors.
Regulation G has been in place for nearly 10 years and several recent empirical
studies have attempted to analyze the lasting effects of the legislation. The results have
been mixed; while studies have shown that opportunistic behavior is curbed to an extent,
managers are becoming more creative with their disclosures, and pro forma vs GAAP
differences are once again on the rise. 9
This study focuses on the trends in pro forma reporting post-regulation with an
emphasis on activity during the Great Recession. Analysis shows, using Benford’s Law10
that during recessionary times since 1950, reported financial statement numbers fail to
conform to Benford’s Law, indicating increased levels of intentional manipulation.11 The
intuition is as follows: management faces increased pressure during tough economic
times, and that Regulation G may have outlived its initial scare, creating the strong
possibility that earnings manipulation is apparent via pro forma earnings announcements
during the Great Recession. Moreover, I examine the characteristics of the pro forma
reporting firms.
This study analyzes the trends of pro forma reporting by looking at the
constituents of the S&P 500 for years 2007-2011. During the early 2000s, the last US
8

Heflin, F., Hsu, C., 2005. The impact of the SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP disclosures.
Working paper, Florida State University and Purdue University.
9
McVay, S., 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core
earnings and special items. The Accounting Review, 81, 501–531.
10
A mathematical law that predicts the frequency of naturally occurring numbers
11
Tilden, Christi, and Troy Janes. "Empirical Evidence of Financial Statement Manipulation during
Economic Recessions." Journal of Finance and Accountancy (2012): n. pag. Web.
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recession, the difference between GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings reached an alltime high; amounting to nearly a $170 billion dollar earnings gap.12 Pro forma earnings
have not been around long enough to look back on other recessions. Have pro forma
earnings once again become a moral hazard? There is a right and wrong way to use pro
forma reporting. Whether management has fallen back into the pattern of excluding “all
the bad things” and whether these behaviors are intensified during recessionary times is
the crux of what is being looked at in this study. If the earnings gap represents a subtle
form of earnings management it could have important implications on financial statement
users, managers, regulators, and other practitioners.

3. Literature Review
To the best of my knowledge, to date, no literature exists that examines pro forma
trends with respect to the latest financial crisis. Prior research tends to focus on pro forma
pre/post Regulation G, the usefulness of pro forma reporting, the dangers of pro forma
reporting, the characteristics of pro forma reporters, previous trends, as well as, the nature
of management behavior and accounting manipulation during recessionary times. These
studies, which are discussed in greater detail below, shed light on why this subtle form of
accounting manipulation could be more prevalent during recessionary times.
Prior to regulation (pre 2002), pro forma earnings had no accepted definition;
therefore, it was difficult to see the purpose of pro forma reporting. However, as stated
12

Schlank, Rosemary. "AccountingWEB." Investors See Record Gaps in Pro Forma vs. GAAP Earnings.
N.p., 30 Jan. 2002. Web. 04 Jan. 2013.
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earlier, investors primarily looked at pro forma earnings for valuation. Bhattacharya et al.
(2003) investigates the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings.
They find, by using short window abnormal returns around earnings announcements, that
pro forma earnings are significantly more informative than GAAP earnings with respect
to future earnings potential.13 In a follow-up study, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) conclude
that some managers employ these disclosures opportunistically. Doyle et al. (2003) find
that some excluded expenses from “street” earnings are predictive of lower future cash
flows, indicating that managers falsely classify some recurring expenses as non-recurring
expenses. So while it is clear that pro forma earnings are useful to analysts and investors;
evidence suggests that pro forma earnings are also a vehicle used by managers to
manipulate earnings.
The opportunistic nature of pro forma earnings shows another alarming trend; a
disproportionate number of firms that were just meeting or beating analyst earnings
forecasts.14 Evidence leading up to regulation for years 1998-2001, revealed 80 percent of
pro forma announcers were meeting or exceeding analyst forecasts, while only 39 percent
of these same firms were meeting or exceeding forecasts when using GAAP earnings.15
The growing complexity and length of 10-Ks were forcing many investors to accept what
management was reporting. Although it seemed as though “everyone” is doing it; there is

13

Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T., Larson, C., 2003. Assessing the relative
informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 285–319.
14
Doyle, J., Soliman, M., 2011. Do managers define “Street” earnings to meet or beat analyst
forecasts? Working paper, University of Utah and Stanford University.
15
Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T., Larson, C., 2003. Assessing the relative
informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 285–319.
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generally a typical pro forma announcer profile. Pro forma announcers tend to be
relatively young firms, concentrated in the technology and business services industries.
They typically carry more debt, and are significantly less profitable than other firms in
their respective industries.16 This is the typical profile for pro forma abusers; however, as
First Call’s research Chief, Chuck Hill stated in 2002, “It’s snowballing—we’re seeing
more and more companies reporting their earnings in numerous different ways, and
analysts are going along with it.17”
Prior to regulation, manager recommendations on exclusions were not easy for
auditors or analysts to refute because, in most cases, they were not easy to understand. Gu
and Chen (2004), find that analysts were fairly skilled in reversing some of the more
egregious exclusions brought forth by managers but could not completely unwind or
catch other more hidden exclusions. The biggest challenge for auditors and analysts alike
is flushing out the exact amount that the exclusion should be. Determining whether an
item is recurring or non-recurring is not black and white; professional judgment is
typically necessary. Gu and Chen (2004) show that although analysts appear to have the
skills to help mediate GAAP and pro forma earnings, it is not a perfect science, and
accounting items themselves are hard to classify when it comes to valuation effects
moving forward. The most typical exclusions are restructuring charges, acquisitions
expenses, and “other” categories. Expenses falling under the umbrella of “other” are
especially hard to deconstruct.
16

Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean,
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003).
17
Bradshaw, M., Sloan, R., 2002. GAAP versus the Street: An empirical assessment of two
alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 41–66.
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As expected, Regulation G provided much needed guidance in helping investors
understand the pro forma figure that companies presented. Entwistle et al. (2006) looks at
the effects of Regulation G within the scope of the S&P 500. They find from hand
collected quarterly releases, the proportion of pro forma announcers dropped from 77 to
54 percent, and the magnitudes are smaller, indicating reporting in a potentially less
suspicious way. Heflin and Hsu (2005), who take a broader approach and observe the
effects of Regulation G across thousands of firms, find that Regulation G produced
“modest” declines in frequency of pro forma announcers, a decline in exclusion
magnitude, as well as a decline in the probability that pro forma earnings meet or beat
analyst forecasts. These findings indicate a positive effect brought forward by SarbanesOxley; it would appear the managers decreased their opportunistic behavior. Such
evidence also helped show that the past (pre-regulation) is littered with opportunistic
management behavior.
Regulation G curtailed some opportunistic behavior, but did not provide an
answer to solve all problems within the pro forma playing field. One unintended
consequence is that the regulations seem to shy companies away from reporting pro
forma figures when they would have been most useful.18 Regulation G made
reconciliation to pro forma figures transparent but also very costly. Some companies
elected to only report GAAP earnings when they had special items on their books that
would have employed the use of a more useful non-GAAP earnings figure. Aside from
scaring companies away, studies in the late 2000s are showing that the effects of

18

Heflin, F., Hsu, C., 2005. The impact of the SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP disclosures.
Working paper, Florida State University and Purdue University.
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regulation were wearing off. Since Q1 of 2003, income increasing exclusions have been
on a steady rise.19 Other studies show that managers are getting more creative with their
exclusions. McVay (2006), finds evidence of more recurring expenses being shifted to
other more mysterious accounts such as “other”, or “special items.” The average 10-K is
now well over 100 pages long and full of confusing footnotes; it is no surprise managers
are continuing to find other ways to increase the bottom line.
The behaviors of managers during economic downturns as well as booms have
been studied in relation to earnings manipulation for decades. In general, the findings
have been mixed; however what is understood is the underlying motivations of managers.
Managers face pressures from external sources (analysts’ forecasts, contractual
obligations, stock market perceptions, etc.), from company culture attributes
(stockholders, management compensation, company goals, etc.), and also from other
miscellaneous sources (personal bonuses, political reasons, etc.). Recent studies show
that managers do not all act similarly during economic downturns. Tilden and Janes
(2012) find increased levels of manipulation during recessionary times since 1950; while
Strobl (2008), find that the most severe earnings manipulation occurred during times of
economic prosperity. Strobl suggests that during economic downturns, investors expect
some degree of accounting manipulation and therefore put less emphasis on released
reports, which makes incentives low for managers deciding to engage in earnings
manipulation. Strobl also suggests that stricter disclosure regulations lead to more
manipulation. On the other hand, Lin & Shih (1994), find strong evidence of
19

Doyle, J., Soliman, M., 2011. Do managers define “Street” earnings to meet or beat analyst
forecasts? Working paper, University of Utah and Stanford University.
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manipulation during the 1990-1991 US recession. They also suggest that there may be a
threshold that managers hit during economic downturns that ultimately determines the
degree of manipulation; if managers have no chance of receiving bonuses and feel as
though the company is unable to be saved, they will defer income for the purpose of
manipulating earnings in a future period, but if they are on the threshold they may work
to manage earnings to get out of the hole. Alarmingly, some of the most advanced
accounting manipulations via pro forma earnings have a long run outlook. Earnings
reserves are kept in arbitrary accounts to be strategically released in the future, for the
purpose of long-run maximization.

4. Data
This study explores whether pro forma earnings reporting behavior changes over
the time period of 2007-2011. The primary interest is identifying trends in firms’ pro
forma reporting behavior. I use data on firms that make up the S&P 500 for years 20072011.
Pro forma figures are typically found within quarterly press releases. Data is
obtained from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). For the purpose of this study,
I/B/E/S actual quarterly earnings are used to proxy for the non-GAAP earnings figure
disclosed by managers in the press releases. It should be noted that, I/B/E/S actual
earnings serves as only a proxy. Prior research has shown that analysts tend to exclude
the more transitory items from earnings, and that the nonrecurring items they include in

16

actual earnings are more persistent and have higher valuation multiples than the expenses
they exclude from actual earnings (Gu and Chen, 2004).
All remaining variables, including quarterly GAAP Earnings per share and
control variables, are from Compustat data. The data covers the 20 fiscal quarters
beginning with Q1 2007 and ending with Q4 2011. Constituents of the S & P 500 change
year to year, therefore only companies that are members of the S & P 500 from Q1 2007Q4 2011 are observed. While this limits my data and may cause some survivorship bias,
this time period allows for ample time before and after the S&P 500 index hit rock
bottom on March 6, 2009. Given some quarters did not have data for a firm, the sample is
includes 442 firms and 8,840 quarter observations.
The dependent variable is defined as the difference between I/B/E/S actual
earnings and GAAP (DIFF). I argue that this dependent variable is best suited for
examining trends in pro forma reporting because it is the most easily quantifiable metric
for understanding discrepancies in pro forma and GAAP earnings numbers.
Assuming trends of pro forma reporters have, for the most part, not changed since
the early 2000s, important variables to control for are: firm size, intangibles (as
percentage of total assets), debt levels, profitability, quarter in which reporting, and
amount of special items reported. These serve as the independent variables that are used
in hypothesis 3.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the average difference between pro forma
and GAAP per year (2007-2011) and for the independent variables. Over the five years,
on average, the difference for constituents of the S&P 500 is about $0.11. As predicted,
the peak of this difference is in 2008, the lead up year to rock bottom of the financial
17

crisis, $0.23. Panel B, graphically depicts this trend over the 20 observed quarters. During
the 4th quarter of 2008, the biggest difference in these two values is $0.56. This same
quarter is the only time in which the average GAAP EPS is negative ($0.27). The S&P
500 consists of 500 companies that are leading companies in market capitalization on the
U.S. stock market, thus unsurprisingly Table 1 reveals that the firms included in this
analysis are generally very large firms, with mean total assets of just over $50 Billion, the
largest being Bank of America during the third quarter of 2010 ($2.36T), and the smallest
being First Solar Inc during the first quarter of 2007 ($618 Million). Of these firms, the
average percentage of intangibles as a part of total assets is around 20 percent and
average leverage is 1.61 percent. Of the 8,840 firm quarter observations over five years,
just under 11 percent, or around 840 firm quarter observations displayed GAAP losses.

5. Methodological Approach and Results
5.1 Hypothesis 1: Proportion of Disclosers
When disclosing financial results, a firm must consider whether to report a pro
forma figure, and if so how to calculate the pro forma figure. As mentioned, the central
issue in this paper is how these disclosure decisions have been affected by the presence of
a major economic recession. Prior studies have documented an association between
earnings management and declining firm performance. I have also discussed earlier the
multitude of pressures that fall on management during tougher economic times, such as
analysts’ forecasts, contractual obligations, and stock market perceptions. Earnings
18

management has been uncovered for years; however, what may be alarming to investors
is the fact that, presumably, some earnings management goes undetected. After regulation
in 2002, of which the purpose was not to eliminate pro forma reporting, but simply to call
for a clear reconciliation of how the firm arrived at a figure, we saw a decrease in the
proportion of firms reporting any non-GAAP figure.20 It would appear as though
regulation discouraged managers using pro forma figures opportunistically otherwise no
decline should have been observed. Unfortunately, since the modest decline in frequency
in the immediate years after Regulation G, pro forma reporting has been on the rise again;
a steady rise has been seen in the percentage of firms reporting pro forma figures since
2003.21 Because managers have the right to report pro forma figures when they deem
necessary this may not necessarily signify earnings management is on the rise. As Gu and
Chen (2004) find in their sample of 28,542 quarterly footnote entries, the most common
non-recurring items included in pro forma reconciliations are: restructuring charges
(22%), other (15%), acquisition expenses (14%), and asset sale gain (11%). Restructuring
charges are typically incurred when a company is not doing well and must close down
plants, lay off workers, etc. To that end, an economic recession therefore could very well
see an increase in pro forma reporting due to a slew of restructuring charges within
struggling companies. With that said, however; prior research has shown the
sophistication of managers who use large “restructuring charges” or similar accounts tend

20

Heflin, F., Hsu, C., 2005. The impact of the SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP disclosures. Working paper,
Florida State University and Purdue University.
21
Doyle, J., Soliman, M., 2011. Do managers define “Street” earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts?
Working paper, University of Utah and Stanford University.
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to overestimate the write down initially, only to reverse them in the future.22 When these
charges are overestimated early, they can provide a cushion for the future when earnings
fall just short; investors rarely look at the history of these charges.23 I expect the
proportion of firms to continue to rise through the recession because of the presence of an
economic downturn, as well as, possible earnings management. When thinking about the
proportion of firms reporting non-GAAP figures and the behavior of management, this
leads to the first hypothesis.

H1: The percentage of firms disclosing pro forma earnings should increase from Q1 2007
to Q1 2009.

Whether or not firms are employing earnings management, the presence of an
economic recession should induce an increase in firms disclosing pro forma earnings. To
the extent an increase is attributed to economic conditions or earnings management is a
question analyzed in detail in the results below.
This study also pays close attention to the behavior of pro forma reporting after
Q1 2009. If the first hypothesis holds true, and then pro forma reporting decreases, then
only to rise again in a bimodal fashion, one may assume some previous large exclusions
are being slowly reversed in the future.
I test H1— In the appendix, in Panel A, you see the graphical depiction and table
of the results. Since, I am interested in seeing the effect of income increasing exclusions,
22

Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley &
Sons, 2003. Print.
23
Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley &
Sons, 2003. Print.
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I only count the firm as a pro forma reporter if the pro forma number exceeded the GAAP
EPS. In very few cases, GAAP actually exceeds pro forma; these were left out of the
analysis because they represent the minority of differences and are not consistent with the
goal of this paper. Heflin and Hsu (2008) found that the average percentage of firms that
disclose income increasing exclusions since regulation (2002-2007) is around 45%.
Therefore, 45% serves as the population proportion. I then use hypothesis testing for a
population proportion on each quarter; H0: p = 45%, and H1: p > 45%. Looking at the
table, quarterly observations in bold represent observations that were significant at the
5% level.
By looking at the graph and table in Panel A, it is easy to see that since 2007, the
percentage of pro forma reporters clearly increased. What is interesting, and a trend that I
will dive into more discussion about later, is the rise seen in 2011, after a decline in 2010.
The increased number of disclosers leading up to the rock bottom (Q1 2009) is much less
intriguing, than the increased number of disclosers since Q4 2010.
Of the 20 quarters observed, more than half (11) had a significant increase in
disclosers from the baseline of 45% observed from years 2002-2007. Of the five fourth
quarter observations, four of them had a significant increase in disclosers. Q4 2008 was
the quarter right before the S & P 500 hit rock bottom, and also the quarter that had the
highest number of income increasing disclosures, 55%. H1 was a good launching point to
observe that indeed the pro forma environment was being affected by the recession; H2
and H3 provide further descriptive evidence of this trend.

21

5.2 Hypothesis 2: Magnitudes of Disclosers

Similar to the above hypothesis, the interest is in the sheer difference between
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. When firms decide whether to disclose pro forma
earnings, managers must also decide what GAAP income components to exclude. If pro
forma reporting is used more frequently during the Great Recession, casual empiricism
suggests that the average difference between GAAP and non-GAAP figures should
increase along with the percentage of firms disclosing. Recent evidence shows that since
regulation firms have become more creative in where they hide transitory items.24 This
practice would enable pro forma reporters to add more exclusions to income increasing
adjustments. The pressures put upon management would give firms incentives to be sure
to maximize their exclusions when disclosing pro forma figures. I believe that not only
will the percentage of disclosers increase, but the magnitudes of difference will increase
as well because of the presence of earnings management. Therefore, to observe trends in
pro forma reporting, magnitudes of exclusions must be taken into account, and this leads
to hypothesis two:

H2: The magnitude of the difference between GAAP and pro forma earnings should
increase from Q1 2007 to Q1 2009.

24

McVay, S., 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core earnings
and special items. The Accounting Review, 81, 501–531.
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Similar to H1, special attention is paid to whether there are continuing trends after
Q1 2009. If magnitudes increase, there could be signs of the sophisticated strategies
employed by managers as mentioned earlier.
I test H2— in the appendix; Panel B and accompanying tables show the results to
H2. H1 shows that there were now more pro forma reporters, but that did not necessarily
mean higher magnitudes of exclusions. Prior research showed that magnitudes decreased
after the introduction of Regulation G, but what effect would a recession have? The graph
in Panel B tells the story. The levels seen before the recession and after the introduction
of Regulation G, namely years 2002-2007, were magnitudes between $0.02-$0.06. The
graph shows that the turbulent trend of exclusion magnitudes, reaching at times $0.56
(2008 Q4), have not since returned to pre-recessionary levels as of the end of 2011.
In terms of my hypothesis, I find an increase in exclusion magnitudes from Q1
2007 to Q1 2009; however, what is interesting is the most significant differences from the
baseline quarter of Q1 2007, are not in the year 200925 (besides the quarter of interest Q1
2009), but instead in years 2008 and 2011; please refer to the tables within Panel B. In
terms of the most significant exclusion magnitude differences compared to Q1 2007, I
observe a significant difference in Q3 2008, Q4 2008, Q1 2009, and Q4 2011. And in
terms of the most significant exclusion magnitude differences compared to the year 2007,
I see a significant difference in 2008, 2009, and 2011.
These observations lent me to sift through prior literature that might help tell the
story behind these trends. One would wonder why, during 2010, well within the range of

25

March 9, 2009 was when the S & P 500 index hit rock bottom at 676.53
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the financial crises, there were mild differences in exclusion magnitudes between GAAP
and pro forma. And why did 2011 see such an increase in difference magnitudes?
In the favor of appropriate manager exclusion decisions, the significant increase
in the latter half of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 makes sense. As pointed out in the
literature review section, Gu and Chen (2004), found that the most common nonrecurring items included in pro forma reconciliations are restructuring charges.
Restructuring charges are most closely related to poor performance; when companies are
closing down plants, laying off workers, etc. With that said, a significant amount of
legitimate restructuring charges could have been excluded in arriving at pro forma
figures; therefore, increasing the magnitudes during this time period.
However, the restructuring charge reconciliation does not do well in explaining
the difference in magnitudes seen in 2011. Proving any kind of earnings management
during the years of 2008 and 2009 would be challenging, seeing as, legitimate one-time
expenses could have prevailed, considering the economic environment. But how then,
during 2011, a time of recovery, are “non-recurring” expenses once again on the rise?
Well, as mentioned earlier, this evidence alludes to possible earnings management, very
sophisticated earnings management. Without claiming earnings management, it is
important to note a discovery prior literature has found in the use of “long-term” planning
in pro forma reporting. Just after Regulation G, Arthur Levitt, former SEC chairman
warned that the SEC had noticed a pattern of companies taking large restructuring
charges, only to reverse some of those expenses later on in the future. The early
overstatement of restructuring charges, allow companies to create a type of reserve,

24

hidden deep in the financials that can be called upon on a later date to boost earnings26.
Although regulation G doesn’t allow companies to take the same “one-time” charge in
consecutive years, companies are simply changing the names of the write-offs to get
around this rule27. And as explained earlier, restructuring charges were the most common
write off. At any rate, it appears that financial statement users need to view large
“special” charges with a great deal of skepticism, because there could be a manager with
a long term plan to make the company look better.
This story could be useful in understanding why there was a major difference in
magnitudes seen during the beginning of the recession, a relatively mild period, and then
once again a major difference in magnitudes during the recovery phase. It could be the
possibility that managers were reversing these writes downs, in hopes of speeding up
recovery. This of course is only speculation.

5.3 Hypothesis 3: The Drivers Behind Magnitudes
Evidence shows that not only are pro forma disclosures used to opportunistically
manage earnings, but the typical abusers have similar characteristics.28 Bhattacharya et.
al. (2004) find from a sample size of 1,149 hand collected pro forma press
announcements that pro forma reporters are typically in service industries (specifically

26
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27
Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley &
Sons, 2003. Print.
28
Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean,
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003).

25

high tech), relatively young firms, large market cap firms, firms with relatively higher
debt levels, less profitable, and firms with relatively high PE ratios. This sort of evidence
helps establish the third hypothesis, and controls that should accompany the multivariate
test.
In practice, there are typically three major targets that tend to exist: (1) reporting a
profit, (2) meeting or beating analyst’s expectations, and (3) avoiding an earnings
decrease. In my preliminary observations, of the 442 companies over 20 different
quarters, on average 89% post a profit in terms of GAAP (11% report a loss); and on
average 93% post a profit in terms of pro forma (7% report a loss). This 4% difference
suggests, of the 11% that report a loss on GAAP (49 companies), nearly 4% (18
companies) manage to report a profit when it comes to pro forma. This shows a heavy
importance of companies finding ways to report a positive earnings number. Please refer
to Panel C in the appendix to see the graphical display. This sort of preliminary
information led me to H3; negative earnings would be a major catalyst in determining the
difference in magnitudes between GAAP and pro forma.

H3: The largest driver in the differences in magnitude between GAAP-non-GAAP
reporting should be whether a firm reported a loss for that quarterly observation

To test the third hypothesis, I use cross sectional panel data and a random effects
linear model. A random effects model allows me to most appropriately take into account
that observations are taken over time on the same firms using the same units. Prior
research has suggested the inclusion of other independent variables. Lougee and
26

Marquardt (2004) suggests that larger firms are more likely to disclose pro forma results
different from GAAP, therefore, firm size is included as the natural log of total assets
(LNASSET). Lougee and Marquardt also suggest that firms with higher leverage are
more likely to disclose pro forma earnings, therefore, debt to equity ratios for each
company are used (LEV). Following Heflin and Hsu (2008), intangible assets (INTANG)
is included as the amount of intangible assets on the balance sheet for a firm as a
percentage of total assets. Because exclusions arise from intangible assets in some cases,
one expects firms with a high percentage of intangibles on the balance sheet to have, on
average, a higher magnitude of difference.
Two additional controls which are consistent with managers’ motivations and
pressures faced in regards to firm performance, LOSS and Q4, respectively, are included
in the analysis. These are both included as binary variables. LOSS equals 1 during any
quarter observation in which GAAP earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. One expects
that firms with GAAP losses should be more likely to increase the difference between
their GAAP and pro forma number. Q4 equals 1 during any quarter observation that is
during the fourth quarter of a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Mendenhall and Nichols (1988)
suggest managers face increased pressures during the fourth quarter.
Finally, prior research suggests firms with special items and restructuring costs
use these categories to increase pro forma figures (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). SPEC,
monetary amount of special items listed on the balance sheet, as well as, RESTRUCT,
amount of restructuring costs for quarter, are used as two additional controls. The lag
variable, denoted δ is the DIFF of the previous quarter regressed on the current quarter
DIFF in order to see if there is a consistency among firms, possibly alluding to intent to
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manage earnings; this will show the level of consistency in reporting pro forma figures;
consistency in pro forma would be frowned upon, because pro forma earnings are
described as “non-recurring”, so any level of consistency would suggest earnings
management. More specifically, I estimate a model of the following form:
(RE)

Where DIFF is the difference between I/B/E/S actual earnings and GAAP and individual
firms are denoted by i and t denotes time. Year is a vector of year indicator variables
(2007-2011, the left out category is 2007). FC is a vector of financial characteristics (i.e.,
LNASSETS, SPEC, INTANG, LOSS, LEV, RESTRUCT, q4). DIFFt-1 represents the lag
variable for t-1 firm specific quarterly observations, and ε represents the usual residual,
mean=0, uncorrelated with itself. The strength of a random effects model is the flexibility
to give correct estimates in the presence of correlated errors that arise from a data
hierarchy.
The regression results can be seen in the Table 2 of the Appendix. Overall, the
regression is a respectable predictor of the difference (DIFF) between pro forma and
GAAP EPS, with 20% of the variation in differences being explained by the model.
H2 is further strengthened by the regression results. As mentioned above,
significant differences in magnitudes were seen during years 2008 and 2011, in relation
to baseline year 2007. The regression results show the same. Years 2008 and 2009 are
both significant at the 1% level. Compared to 2007, the difference (DIFF) between pro
forma and GAAP increases on average by $0.14 (2008) and $0.11 (2011) for a firms’
quarterly EPS earnings announcement.
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The coefficients on the variables are as I would expect and significant variables in
determining the DIFF are some of the variables I would expect. Specifically, LOSS,
which was my variable of interest in H3, is significant at the 1% level. My results
indicate that, when firms report an operating GAAP loss, the difference (DIFF) between
GAAP and pro forma will be, on average, $0.76. This magnitude of difference is quite
alarming. This goes back to my theory that managers will do everything in their power to
get out of the red, even if that means an EPS of zero.
Prior to the results, a firm’s percentage of intangibles as a part of total assets was
thought to have a positive effect on DIFF; that is, the more intangible heavy a firm is, the
more likely they are to report a larger magnitude of difference in pro forma. As the
results show, within the sample of S & P 500 firms, for every increase of one percent of
intangibles, on average, the DIFF rises by $0.19. This lends support to prior literature that
suggests that high tech firms, are in many cases the worst abusers of pro forma
reconciliations.29
Another set of significant independent variables were SPEC (special items) and
RESTRUCT (restructuring costs). These were both significant at the 1% level; however,
have coefficients that are so small that they do not affect DIFF as much as their p-values
would suggest. The size of the firm (LNASSETS), amount of leverage in capital structure
(LEV), and which quarter an observation came from (Q4), appears to have little effect on
the difference in magnitudes reported.
Although I set out to explore the impact that LOSS had on DIFF, the most
interesting variable and coefficient may be the DIFF L1—The lag variable. This was
29
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included to gain a sense of what level of consistency did the same firm report pro forma
figures different from GAAP figures. Considering that pro forma practice was meant to
be a way for firms to limit their exposure to non-recurring items, it would suggest that no
level of consistency should be apparent—the results suggest otherwise. Although I would
expect some level of correlation between t and t-1, significance at the 1% level, and a
coefficient of nearly $0.10 suggests there is a level of consistency of firms to report pro
forma figures different from GAAP quarter over quarter.
One story behind this interesting result could be managers’ confidence that they
could slide more past investors during a recessionary time. Until the Enron collapse,
many had challenged, “What’s the big deal? Aren’t there always accounting related
surprises in a recessionary economy? 30” This sort of attitude could lead managers to
believe that they could consistently find expenses to exclude during this time because
investors would simply understand that ‘everyone’ was doing poorly. Once again the
long run strategies mentioned earlier would come into play. By taking consistent write
downs and restructuring charges during times of little observance, reversals could be used
in future periods in a slow drawn out way to attract less attention. This of course is only
an idea and may not be the true nature of what was going on; however, future research
could explore this idea further. Did managers use long term strategies during the Great
Recession in terms of pro forma reporting to create reserves to draw upon in future time
periods?
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6. Conclusion

Investors should think twice before accepting a pro forma earnings figure as truth
before looking a little closer into the reconciliation of that figure. Prior studies, my study,
and presumably future studies will continue to find some peculiar patterns in financial
statements. It is up to the user to be aware of when there is possibility for deception, and
up to others to help curb the deception on the part of managers. There is a lot that goes
into accounting for a company, and the pressures of today’s financial environment can
lead managers to do things they would not otherwise do.
This study was not intended to make any bold conclusions as to whether earnings
management was apparent during the Great Recession, nor to support or criticize the use
of pro forma EPS; it was simply to shed light on trends in pro forma reporting seen
during the financial crisis, and to speculate what may explain the trends seen in the
results. The results have shown that there was indeed a significant increase in the
proportion of pro forma disclosers and the magnitudes of those disclosers. Results from
the regression have concluded that the presence of negative earnings and intangibles have
a significant effect on the magnitude of difference between pro forma and GAAP. Results
have also shown significant increases in magnitudes during years 2008 and 2011, as well
as, a level of consistency in the lag variable. These results allude to a possible strategy of
long-term earnings management, but more in depth research would be needed to make
this conclusion.
The biggest limitation of this study is that I/B/E/S analyst estimates were used as
a proxy for pro forma numbers. A hand-collected sample of press releases, as well as a
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more diverse sample of firms would possibly solidify results. Future research in this topic
could look to dive deeper to what exclusions were made during 2008, and if reversals of
those exclusions were partly due to the apparent increase during 2011.
The pro forma debate will continue to rage on, as to whether it serves an
important platform for companies to portray to investors a reported measure that more
closely identifies “core” earnings; until then, more research will continue to look into not
only the usefulness of pro forma reporting but also the integrity that lies behind it.
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Appendix

Panel A: Percentage of Pro Forma Disclosers
60%

50%
45%
40%

̂
√

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Q1
44%
48%
51%
51%
51%

Q2
40%
48%
49%
47%
52%

Q3
48%
51%
47%
47%
49%
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Q4
Yr. Avg
48%
45%
55%
51%
50%
49%
51%
49%
53%
51%

2011 Q4

2011 Q3

2011 Q2

2011 Q1

2010 Q4

2010 Q3

2010 Q2

2010 Q1

2009 Q4

2009 Q3

2009 Q2

2009 Q1

2008 Q4

2008 Q3

2008 Q2

2008 Q1

2007 Q4

2007 Q3

2007 Q2

35%
2007 Q1

Percentage

55%

Panel B: Magnitude Trends
$1.00

$0.80

Dollars

$0.60

$0.40

GAAP

Pro Forma
Difference

$0.20

$(0.20)

2007 Q1
2007 Q2
2007 Q3
2007 Q4
2008 Q1
2008 Q2
2008 Q3
2008 Q4
2009 Q1
2009 Q2
2009 Q3
2009 Q4
2010 Q1
2010 Q2
2010 Q3
2010 Q4
2011 Q1
2011 Q2
2011 Q3
2011 Q4

$-

$(0.40)

2007 Q1
2007 Q2
2007 Q3
2007 Q4
2008 Q1
2008 Q2
2008 Q3
2008 Q4
2009 Q1
2009 Q2
2009 Q3
2009 Q4
2010 Q1
2010 Q2
2010 Q3
2010 Q4
2011 Q1
2011 Q2
2011 Q3
2011 Q4

DIFF
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

0.06
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.12
0.22
0.56
0.15
0.10
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.08
0.11
0.12
0.21

Year DIFF
Z stat
Prob
2007 $ 0.03
Base
2008 $ 0.23
-4.475
0.000 ***
2009 $ 0.08
-1.982
0.024 **
2010 $ 0.05
-1.174
0.120
2011 $ 0.14
-3.071
0.001 ***

Z stat
Prob
Base
1.052
0.146
1.137
0.128
0.656
0.256
0.514
0.304
-1.124
0.130
-1.962
0.025 **
-3.714
0.000 ***
-1.750
0.040 **
-0.923
0.178
0.705
0.240
0.512
0.304
-0.144
0.443
0.135
0.446
0.191
0.424
0.695
0.243
-0.379
0.352
-0.751
0.226
-1.040
0.149
-2.031
0.021 **

***P<0.01
**P<0.05
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1.247
1.018
1.338
700.7
0.204
0.295
76.30
49.14
0.433

1.110

2007-2011
X

0.588
0.695
9.618
-61.5
0.201
0.096
1.641
-9.47
0.250

0.107

Mean Std.Dev.

0.670
0.696
9.466
-50.4
0.192
0.060
3.368
-8.63
0.250

0.897
1.228
1.386
744.4
0.200
0.237
19.32
50.43
0.433

0.026 1.170

Mean Std.Dev.

2007

2009

2010

2011

1.795

0.372 1.892
0.617 1.201
9.521 1.347
-135 1136
0.200 0.204
0.132 0.334
2.931 29.65
-12.9 67.11
0.249 0.433

0.233

0.470
0.549
9.492
-26.7
0.203
0.145
2.100
-11.0
0.250

0.080

0.944
0.792
1.334
495.1
0.206
0.352
42.94
44.77
0.433

0.660

0.686
0.744
9.58
-37.7
0.203
0.072
1.282
-7.14
0.250

0.054

0.871
0.810
1.334
340.2
0.204
0.258
33.83
35.00
0.433

0.465

0.738
0.866
9.661
-57.5
0.208
0.073
-1.38
-7.74
0.250

0.140

1.283
0.957
1.321
508.4
0.205
0.260
156.4
42.69
0.433

0.964

Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.

2008

This sample covers the first quarter of 2007 through the fourth quarter of 2011
Variable Definitions:
DIFF = Monetary difference between Pro Forma and GAAP as reported by Constituent
GAAP = (basic) earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
PRO FORMA = I/B/E/S reported actual (basic) earnings per share
LNASSET = To control for firm size, natural log of total assets
SPEC = Amount of special items reported in given quarter
INTANG = Total intangibles as a percentage of total assets on the balance sheet
LOSS = Binary variable, 1 if GAAP reported loss, 0 otherwise
LEV = Leverage, debt to equity ratio for constituent
RESTRUCT = Amount of restructuring charges reported in given quarter
Q4 = Binary variable, 1 if observation is from 4th quarter
YEARTREND = Fixed effect independent variable
Id_var = lag variable, DIFF t-1

YEAR
Id_var

Time Series Var

GAAP
PRO FORMA
LNASSET
SPEC
INTANG
LOSS
LEV
RESTRUCT
Q4

Control Variables

DIFF

Dependent Variable

Overall Sample

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics

TABLE 2
(1)
DIFF

VARIABLES
Year08

0.137***
(0.0373)
0.0113
(0.0374)
0.0406
(0.0372)
0.111***
(0.0372)
-0.00420
(0.00862)
-0.000547***
(1.61e-05)
0.187***
(0.0563)
0.760***
(0.0389)
-3.15e-05
(0.000136)
0.00239***
(0.000226)
0.0313
(0.0255)
0.0991***
(0.0100)
-0.0543
(0.0890)

Year09
Year10
Year11
LNASSETS
SPEC
INTANG
LOSS
LEV
RESTRUCT
Q4
L.DIFF
Constant

Observations
8,398
Number of id_var
442
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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